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Characterizing the neural implementation of abstract conceptual representations has long been a contentious topic in
cognitive science. At the heart of the debate is whether the “sensorimotor” machinery of the brain plays a central role in
representing concepts, or whether the involvement of these perceptual and motor regions is merely peripheral or
epiphenomenal. The domain of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) learning provides an important
proving ground for sensorimotor (or grounded) theories of cognition, as concepts in science and engineering courses are
often taught through laboratory-based and other hands-on methodologies. In this review of the literature, we examine
evidence suggesting that sensorimotor processes strengthen learning associated with the abstract concepts central to
STEM pedagogy. After considering how contemporary theories have defined abstraction in the context of semantic
knowledge, we propose our own explanation for how body-centered information, as computed in sensorimotor brain
regions and visuomotor association cortex, can form a useful foundation upon which to build an understanding of
abstract scientific concepts, such as mechanical force. Drawing from theories in cognitive neuroscience, we then explore
models elucidating the neural mechanisms involved in grounding intangible concepts, including Hebbian learning,
predictive coding, and neuronal recycling. Empirical data on STEM learning through hands-on instruction are considered
in light of these neural models. We conclude the review by proposing three distinct ways in which the field of cognitive
neuroscience can contribute to STEM learning by bolstering our understanding of how the brain instantiates abstract
concepts in an embodied fashion.Significance
Increasing academic proficiency in science, technology,
engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields is not only
a goal of educators in these disciplines, but also a na-
tional priority spurred on by international comparisons
revealing that US high school students currently rank
27th in mathematics and 20th in science out of the 34
nations that comprise the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2012). As new
technologies have emerged in recent decades that allow
for a more detailed exploration of the inner workings of
the brain, there appears to be the promise of brain
research becoming a useful resource for improving
educational outcomes. However, while research on the
brain basis of learning and memory has greatly advanced
our understanding of brain function, it has not often
been clear how this research can translate to the* Correspondence: david.j.m.kraemer@dartmouth.edu
2Department of Education, Dartmouth College, 5 Maynard St., Hanover, NH
03755, USA
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© The Author(s). 2017 Open Access This article
International License (http://creativecommons.o
reproduction in any medium, provided you giv
the Creative Commons license, and indicate ifclassroom and inform educational practice. A clearer
understanding of the neural basis of STEM learning in
general, and a precise evaluation of hands-on learning
activities in particular, may be able to play a role in de-
veloping activities and structured curricula that allow
students to grasp certain fundamental STEM concepts.
In the present review, we explore the connection be-
tween grounded cognition—the notion that knowledge
partially relies on neural mechanisms pertaining to
sensory and motoric processes—and STEM learning,
evaluating several theories describing how the brain sup-
ports concept learning and proposing new research
avenues awaiting exploration.
Introduction
Semantic knowledge consists of the non-episodic, con-
ceptual information human beings use to understand the
world (Tulving, 1984). One recognizes the objects in his
or her environment by performing neural computations
enabling access to a vast repository of information. An
object’s identity, function, properties, and form reside inis distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
rg/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
e appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
changes were made.
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ledge required to understand intricate mathematical and
scientific theories. Importantly, a distinction must be
made between the ways that the term abstract has been
used in the literature. For instance, the concept dog can,
hypothetically, be represented with a prototype that does
not refer directly to an actual dog, but instead a statis-
tical aggregation of the most frequently encountered fea-
tures of all dogs (e.g., Rosch, 1973). In this way, a mental
construct that represents a generalizable form, but not a
discrete instantiation, of a concrete object can be con-
strued as abstract. The second sense in which the term
abstract is often used denotes a concept lacking a tan-
gible referent in the real world (e.g., Paivio, 1965), such
as justice or peace. In the present discussion, we use the
term abstract primarily in this second sense, to refer to
intangible concepts (e.g., peace, rebellion). Accordingly,
we will use the term concrete when referring to concepts
such as dog, although we proceed with the understand-
ing that it is necessary to generalize or abstract across
exemplars of dogs to refer to a common label. In other
words, we consider a concept to be concrete if it refers
to an object that may be perceived directly in the world,
while abstract concepts rely entirely on relational prop-
erties between other concepts (e.g., peace is an emergent
property of a given state of other concepts and their
interactions and relationships to each other).
An effort to understand how abstract concepts relating
to science and mathematics are most effectively learned
is imperative given that the US educational system now
ranks 35th in mathematics and 29th in science, compared
to other industrialized nations (DeSilver, 2015). There-
fore, domestic policy makers and educators alike are
concerned with the state of learning in STEM disci-
plines. It is no surprise, then, that educational re-
searchers are eager to understand both the mechanisms
enabling conceptual knowledge to be stored, accessed,
and manipulated, and those optimizing the semantic
network for increased learning proficiency.
Theories of embodied cognition, or grounded cogni-
tion (GC), may play an integral role in the search for a
means to improve STEM learning. Adherents of theories
related to GC maintain that sensorimotor networks—-
brain regions (located in sensorimotor cortex and nearby
association cortex) that are preferentially responsive to
information within a specific sensory modality—play a
prominent role in information processing and semantic
retrieval (for a recent review of relevant neuroimaging
data, see Martin, 2016). Such networks consist of simul-
taneously activated brain regions representing the prop-
erties of a given concept—for example, seeing a tool
activates left hemisphere areas including the ventral fusi-
form cortex, parietal cortex, and ventral premotor cortex
(vPMC), regions associated with visual object identification(form, color, shape, etc.), and manipulation, respectively.
Additionally, as frontal and parietal sensorimotor activa-
tion occurs not only amidst cognitively demanding tasks
(e.g., planning for the use of a hammer), but also while
individuals passively view images of tools (e.g., Chouinard
& Goodale, 2010), it seems likely that such properties re-
late to the tool concept itself and not only to specific task
demands. With these findings and similar findings related
to the embodied nature of semantic knowledge (e.g.,
Goldberg, Perfetti, & Schneider, 2006; Hauk, Johnsrude, &
Pulvermüller, 2004) in mind, it is surprising how little is
known regarding the influence of embodied processes on
STEM learning (Han & Black, 2011; Kontra, Lyons,
Fischer, & Beilock, 2015). Whereas a number of investiga-
tions (e.g., Freeman et al., 2014; Winstone & Millward,
2012; Zacharia et al., 2015) have had success exploring
teaching methods beyond lecturing—enhancing student
engagement through reading, writing, group discussion,
and virtual laboratories—we aim to elucidate the benefits
of hands-on approaches to learning, an important compo-
nent in the effort to improve STEM pedagogy.
In the present review, we argue that the cognitive sci-
ence literature has much to glean from future studies
considering how the STEM pedagogy benefits from
hands-on activities, designed to bolster the conceptual
knowledge underlying scientific learning. We begin this
discussion by clarifying the definition of grounded cogni-
tion, a controversial term than has been applied to sev-
eral distinct theories, and then direct the discussion to
grounded theories of abstract (e.g., lacking a real-world
referent) conceptual processing and representation in
the human brain. Finally, we explore possible ways that
learning interventions based on theories of GC can
benefit students in STEM fields by proposing new
empirical directions, bolstering the field’s current under-
standing of the benefits of tactile learning in both live
and virtual environments.
Review
Divergent theories of semantic processing
The basic premise of grounded (for our purposes we will
interchangeably use the terms grounded, embodied, and
situated cognition, but see Barsalou, 2008, for a discus-
sion of some important differences) theories of cognition
is that the brain, body, and environment comprise a sin-
gle, dynamic system. Such a system enables thinking
organisms to extend cognition beyond the central ner-
vous system, enhancing computational efficiency by tak-
ing advantage of primordial cortical processes (e.g.,
Dehaene & Cohen, 2007). Considering a knowledge sys-
tem comprised of these three components has important
implications: neural organization necessarily influences
how the body and environment are perceived, the body
sends feedback to the brain and is used as a metric for
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and the environment constrains the ways in which com-
plex behaviors may be executed (Chiel & Beer, 1997).
Within this framework, context necessarily influences
how knowledge is retrieved and subsequently repre-
sented (Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2012; Yee & Thompson-
Schill, 2016), given that context (i.e., geographical,
situational, spatial, emotional, cognitive) is an integral
component of one’s experiences and the associated con-
cepts. Thus, context influences how a given concept
manifests across novel situations. For instance, a ham-
mer is a small hand-held tool used to drive nails when
considering a household project, and an ornate weapon
of war when contemplating the Norse God of Thunder.
Substituting the former object in the context of the lat-
ter situation would be erroneous—in other words, one
unfamiliar with the story of Thor would be making a se-
mantic error when bringing the household tool to mind
while reading about the Demigod’s weapon of choice.
Yet, to an outsider, this mistaken individual would
appear to fully comprehend the sentence “Thor’s weapon
of choice was a hammer.” This illustration explains how
two people may have a conversation about an object
regardless of whether they have the same object in mind.
Therefore, according to the GC view, semantic knowledge
is inextricably linked to the context in which it is
retrieved, yet flexible enough to be socially transmittable.
Amodal theories of semantic representation
The nature of the semantic system is a contentious topic.
Amodal theorists (e.g., Fodor, 1998; Mahon & Caramazza,
2009) posit that findings typically attributed to GC are
epiphenomenal—i.e., not centrally related to the concepts
at hand—and that an amodal symbolic system enables
concept retrieval. Accordingly, they argue, while sensori-
motor activity enhances semantic representations it is not
constitutive of conceptual knowledge, but instead results
from spreading neural activation following the retrieval of
a given concept in an amodal symbolic system. The key
distinction here is that the central component of a con-
cept—that which is crucial to truly knowing it—must exist
as an amodal symbol, prima facie, in order for the activity
to spread to distinct sensorimotor areas following concept
activation. Adherents of this type of theory cite examples
of category-specific semantic impairments in clinical
populations following lesions to the left temporal lobe,
illustrating the modality independence of discrepancies in
the semantic network. For instance, cases of double-
dissociations in patients unable to recognize either ani-
mate or inanimate objects, regardless of the presentation
modality, provide support for this theory. Given that focal
lesions to this so-called semantic hub can disrupt an entire
category of semantic content, the argument for a single
cortical conceptual system, divided along categorical lines,is compelling; however, this is not the only interpretation
of the available patterns of neuropsycholgical evidence. A
number of case studies (e.g., Carbonnel, Charnallet, David,
& Pellat, 1997; Kemmerer, Rudrauf, Manzel, & Tranel,
2012; McCarthy & Warrington, 1988) challenge the
notion that concept categories exist amodally, represented
via the interactions of discrete, iconic symbols located in
an innate module in MTL.
Multimodal theories of semantic representation
Adherents of grounded theories of semantic representa-
tion deny the requirement of elementary conceptual rep-
resentations for semantic models to function properly.
Instead, they argue that concept representations are both
multimodal and contextually unique, relying on net-
works distributed throughout the cortex and recon-
structed using the features (shape, texture, sound, etc.)
and modalities (visual, phonological, tactile, etc.) in
which they were acquired (e.g., Allport, 1985; Carbonnel
et al., 1997; Farah & McClelland, 1991; Hsu, Frankland,
& Thompson-Schill, 2012; Martin, 2016; McCarthy &
Warrington, 1988). For instance, McCarthy and col-
leagues describe the case of patient (T.O.B.) who was
unable to recognize the spoken names of animals, yet,
when asked to identify photos of animals, provided
robust descriptions. Due to the consistency of the
patient’s impairment over time, the authors suggest a
phonological impairment leading to semantic deficits.
Patient E.C., on the other hand, suffered from complete
visual agnosia, in addition to difficulties with non-visual
knowledge of animals (Carbonnel et al., 1997). When
asked to identify animals using verbal cues, E.C. was bet-
ter at categorizing domestic rather than wild animal-
s—difficulty recognizing the latter, suggest the authors,
exemplifies a visual impairment. In other words, his lack
of experience interacting with wild animals restricted
E.C.’s ability to represent them in modalities other than
vision (also see Warrington & Shallice, 1984; Martin,
2007), while domestic animals, frequently encountered
in everyday life, provide a wealth of multimodal (e.g.,
tactile, emotional, and auditory) experiences for the
patient to draw from. Martin’s (2016) GRAPES (ground-
ing representations in action, perception, and emotion
systems) theory provides additional support for this idea,
suggesting that while concepts are organized based on
object properties, such properties are dependent upon
one’s experiences—i.e., acquired through a specific
sensory modality in accord with one’s physiology and en-
vironment. As an example, for sighted organisms, shape
is represented in occipital cortex given that the property
can be most easily extricated from objects in the envir-
onment using vision. In other words, although know-
ledge about an object’s shape is typically acquired using
the eyes, it may be acquired through other senses if
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those with congenital blindness. Nevertheless, evidence
(Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2012; Ricciardi et al., 2009) sug-
gests that object properties maintain their general loca-
tion in the brain regardless of the modality in which
they were obtained. For example, the congenitally blind
represent object properties typically associated with
vision, such as form, in the same areas of occipital cor-
tex as sighted individuals.
Consistent with Martin’s theory and other theories of dis-
tributed semantic representations, Farah and McClelland
(1991) developed a computational model of semantic mem-
ory, noting that categorical deficits emerge spontaneously
following lesions within this network comprised entirely of
modality-specific subcomponents. The authors assert that
categorization results from the correlation between the
properties of objects belonging to each category—e.g., living
versus non-living. Living things, for instance, are repre-
sented primarily by visual traits due to their properties (e.g.,
visually distinct, non-manipulable) while non-living things
are represented primarily based on functional traits due to
their properties (e.g., highly manipulable). Furthermore,
Farah and McClelland’s model demonstrated that non-
primary representations (e.g., functional properties of living
things) can be impaired following severe damage to the pri-
mary modality (e.g., visual properties of living things), and
spared if the damage is minimal. This finding suggests that
1) disparate brain regions rely on reciprocal inputs to reach
the threshold necessary to retrieve a given conceptual rep-
resentation, and 2) whether or not a category is impaired
depends on the extent to which the primary representa-
tional modality is disrupted. Such a notion is consistent
with prior work, including Allport’s (1985) thesis, stating
that distributed assemblies of neurons firing in distinctive
patterns represent conceptual knowledge. Thus, Farah and
McClelland’s model, informed by prior neuropsychological
findings (McCarthy & Warrington, 1988; Warrington &
Shallice, 1984), provides a parsimonious explanation for
both categorical and non-categorical impairments of con-
ceptual representation.
A hybrid theory of semantic representation
Perhaps pointing to a synthesis of these neuropsycho-
logical findings, hybrid theories of grounded cognition
based in cognitive neuroscience (Barsalou, 1999, 2008;
Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2012; Pulvermüller, 2013) argue
that conceptual representation relies on both sensori-
motor and multimodal (amodal) processes. Hypothesiz-
ing that distributed neural assemblies (DNAs) (Kiefer &
Pulvermüller, 2012; Pulvermüller, 2013) comprise mul-
tiple contextually dependent semantic circuits, such the-
ories account for both sensorimotor and abstract
knowledge. This notion is consistent with Barsalou’s
(1999) Perceptual Symbol Systems (PSS) theory,asserting that multimodal sensorimotor representations
preclude the need for amodal symbols—those typically
associated with atomistic conceptual theories (e.g.,
Fodor, 1998). Convergence zones (CZs; e.g., Damasio,
1989), cortical areas where streams of disparate neural
traces converge, likely account for the influence that dis-
tinct sensorimotor areas exert upon one another (Farah
& McClelland, 1991; Pulvermüller, 2013). Accordingly,
nerve impulses originating in modality-specific regions
and representing concept features (shape, color, etc.),
propagate from their point of origin to adjacent regions,
eventually synapsing on interneurons receiving input
from additional modality-specific neurons. Such neurons
not only integrate feature traces into a coherent repre-
sentation, but also control timing via Hebbian learning
mechanisms (simultaneous firing of NMDA receptors)
feeding an integrated trace to higher cortical areas, result-
ing in robust, multimodal conceptual representations
(Friston, 2003). Due to the parsimony of a hybrid,
grounded/symbolic account of neural processing, we con-
sider such a theory plausible in light of the following
observations:
1. There are numerous studies illustrating the role of
sensorimotor cortex in conceptual processing (for a
review, see Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2012; Bergen, 2012).
2. Amodal theories offer a narrow view of conceptual
content (e.g., “knowing” is often operationalized as
“naming”; Mahon & Caramazza, 2009), and there is ample
neuropsychological, computational, and neuroimaging evi-
dence that semantic information is multimodal (Allport,
1985; Carbonnel et al., 1997; Farah & McClelland, 1991;
Goldberg et al., 2006; McCarthy & Warrington, 1988; for
a review, see Martin, 2007).
3. Concepts are context dependent (e.g., Machery,
2009; for reviews, see Connell & Lynott, 2014; Yee &
Thompson-Schill, 2016). Thus, a single, inflexible repre-
sentational module cannot be assumed to exist in the
absence of any direct evidence to that effect, given that
multiple neural systems are necessary for contributing
contextual cues (e.g., visuospatial regions in occipital
and parietal cortex for visually coded geographic infor-
mation). Without such cues, serving to enrich the mean-
ing of a concept and rendering it contextually flexible, a
semantic representation is rendered incomplete.
4. In agreement with Dehaene and Cohen’s (2007)
Neuronal Recycling Hypothesis, grounding conceptual
knowledge in perceptual and motor systems addresses
the question of how advanced human intellectual sys-
tems, such as language and mathematical reasoning,
developed across a relatively short evolutionary time
scale (e.g., writing began ~5400 years ago). On the other
hand, a dedicated module for semantic processing would
require an evolutionarily expensive process unlikely to
occur in such a short amount of time.
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sensory-specific representations—organized according to
within-modality features—relying on convergence zones
to integrate information across modalities. So far, how-
ever, we have mainly considered data pertaining to
knowledge of concrete objects. Given the importance of
abstract knowledge for both education and general
learning, we now consider how a grounded system sup-
ports knowledge of abstract concepts.
Sensorimotor contributions to abstract concept retrieval
The notion of a concept being abstract can be conceived
in two distinct ways (see Introduction). For instance, any
concept potentially represented in the mind by a proto-
type (e.g., one’s mental image of carrot; Rosch, 1973)
could be characterized as being abstract. Here, we con-
sider a second sense of the term abstract, one consistent
with Paivio’s (1965) work, suggesting that nouns exist on
a spectrum ranging from concrete to abstract, and that
nouns representing concepts referring to perceptible ob-
jects evoke the most vivid mental imagery. Conversely,
concepts with no tangible referent, such as peace and
justice, are more difficult to process because they do not
evoke the same type of mental imagery. Therefore, in
the present discussion, we describe intangible concepts
as abstract and those more directly accessible to the sen-
sory system as concrete.
To further illustrate this distinction, consider that
when one reads words such as justice and compassion in
everyday encounters, such ideas are embedded in a situ-
ational context—e.g., a criminal being apprehended by
the police or a family rescuing a dog from an animal
shelter, respectively. Moreover, contexts vary drastically
for abstract concepts given the flexibility of their mean-
ing (Barsalou, 2008; Granito, Scorolli, & Borghi, 2015).
One might describe bravery in the context of a soldier
rescuing a fellow soldier on the battlefield; the term
could also describe a shy student giving a speech in front
of her peers. While the concept itself is representative of
the same central idea across both of these contexts, i.e.,
carrying out an action despite one’s fears, these two situ-
ations share no common perceptual features. Instead,
understanding that the concept bravery applies in both
situations lies in comprehending the relationship be-
tween an agent and his or her context (actions, environ-
ment, etc.). Therefore, the underlying commonalities
across these unique instantiations of such concepts are
understood through analogical reasoning processes (e.g.,
Gentner, 1983; Gick & Holyoak, 1983). In other words,
abstract concepts consist of the relational properties
arising from the interaction of two or more objects or
agents in a given circumstance, and such concepts share
an underlying commonality despite dissimilarity on the
surface-level (i.e., perceptual features). The multimodalcontextual features of concrete concepts, on the other
hand, are relatively more consistent across contexts, pro-
viding a great deal of information about the meaning of
the concept. For instance, door knobs vary in subtle
ways, but they generally maintain a recognizable form
and are found within a proscribed area on almost any
door. Therefore, we consider the primary distinction be-
tween abstract and concrete concepts to be the features
comprising their representations—i.e., concrete concepts
refer to tangible objects and abstract concepts refer to
the emergent properties which result from the inter-
action of concrete concepts.
The context of abstract semantic content is unstable,
while that of concrete semantic content is comparatively
more durable—i.e., a carrot possesses diagnostic features
that enable its identification despite subtle contextual
discrepancies (a carrot may be brown but maintain its
form; a carrot may have a different form but maintain its
salient orange color, etc.). Therefore, it is more difficult
to retrieve the meaning of abstract compared to concrete
concepts. This is likely due to both the rapid recall of
multimodal features associated with a given concrete
object concept, and the computational demands neces-
sary for retrieving the structural similarity between ab-
stract concepts, resulting from unpredictable variation in
contextual features across situations. Therefore, when
asked to identify an abstract concept, in a word/non-
word task for instance, if the concept is presented in
isolation with no contextual information, one must con-
struct a context in real time in order to understand the
concept—this would explain why individuals are slower
to identify abstract concepts (Schwanenflugel & Shoben,
1983; Xiao, Zhao, Zhang, & Guo, 2012).
Additionally, abstract concepts, unlike concrete con-
cepts, in which an object is perceived before being
assigned a label, require a label to subsume the context-
ual constraints associated with the concept. This ac-
count is consistent with the notion of Recchia and Jones
(2012) that comprehending abstract words requires
context-specific cues, while concrete words rely on ob-
ject features. Namely, when processing words describing
concrete concepts (e.g., car, dog) in a scene, people tend
to focus their attention to the features of the objects
themselves; conversely, when learning novel abstract
words (e.g., disorder), attention is shifted toward the
scene as a whole, while individuals attempt to establish
the relationship between agents and objects in the dis-
play (Granito et al., 2015). Consider an image depicting
the Boston Tea Party, when asked to identify the tea
concept, one might point out the substance being
dumped from bags into the harbor; conversely, if asked
to identify rebellion, one would rely not only on the
interaction between agents engaging in rebellious behav-
ior, but also the geographic location, the affect of the
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gleaned in a history class. Thus, while identifying a con-
crete concept requires one to evoke a flexible yet con-
sistent prototype acquired via statistical regularities
across contexts (e.g., Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2012), iden-
tifying a concept that is entirely relational requires a
great deal more computation resulting from the process
of discovering an analogous relationship between con-
texts, and thus searching a scene for cues denoting such
a relationship which is necessary to determine if a given
token fits the concept (see the “Predictive coding and
Hebbian learning” section below).
Dove (2016) argues that abstract concepts are not eas-
ily reconcilable under current embodied theories, citing
a number of physiological studies demonstrating activa-
tion differences while participants process concrete
rather than abstract concepts. Furthermore, familiarity
with such concepts results in their apparent dissociation
from sensorimotor regions and an increased reliance on
left hemispheric structures (see Binder, Westbury,
McKiernan, Possing, & Medler, 2005). While such find-
ings may appear to bolster amodal conceptual theories,
suggesting distinctive mechanisms for processing con-
crete and abstract concepts, the shallow recognition pro-
tocols (e.g., lexical discrimination tasks) used in many
such tasks fail to account for the contextual relativity
inherent to abstract knowledge. In other words, recog-
nizing a word does not require the same depth of infor-
mation processing as retrieving its meaning. Xiao et al.
(2012), for instance, argue that contextual details facili-
tate recollection of concrete words leading to faster RTs
during a recognition task. Evidenced by an increased
parietal P600 response for tangible concepts, an evoked
potential typically associated with the integration of con-
textual details, the authors conclude that abstract words
are more difficult to process given the absence of such
details when interpreted independently of context, which
is crucial for understanding them (Katja Wiemer-Hastings
& Xu, 2005). In other words, concrete concepts (e.g., car,
shoe) evoke a rapid representation grounded in modality-
specific features (visual, tactile, etc.) while abstract
concepts (e.g., inequality) require external conceptually
relevant cues used to derive a complete understanding of
the idea.
Thus, understanding abstract concepts requires one to
comprehend the relationship between objects, rather
than the objects themselves. This is an idea that is en-
tirely consistent with the literature addressing analogical
transfer (e.g., Gentner, 1983). Consider the resemblance
between what we have characterized above as an ab-
stract concept (e.g., preparation) and a typical example
of an analogy—one might, for instance, construct an
analogy to describe preparation by comparing a student
studying for a difficult examination to a long-distancerunner training for a marathon (law student : studying ::
marathon runner : training). Gick and Holyoak (1980,
1983) refer to the perceivable properties typically associ-
ated with concrete concepts as surface features, while re-
ferring to those denoting the underlying relations
between two or more terms of an analogy as structural
features. Therefore, in our example, the two instances of
preparation do not share surface features as there is no
direct mapping between the perceptible features of a
student studying for a law examination and a runner
training for a marathon. However, the underlying rela-
tions between the analogies are consistent—i.e., both
runners and students must engage in preparations in
order to accomplish their goal. Thus, the structural
properties of the two instantiations of preparation are
shared, while the surface features of the two analogous
scenarios are not.
A natural consequence of the human tendency to con-
struct analogies is apparent when considering how meta-
phors are used to relate everyday notions to broader
concepts. Lakoff and Johnson (1980), for instance, argue
that almost all human conceptual thought relies on
metaphor. Consider, for example, how Westerners con-
ceive of competitive and/or contentious interactions as
war-like—rap battles, fighting disease, culture warriors,
etc. As Lakoff and Johnson point out, this framework is
a cultural artifact, grounding concepts in a familiar, con-
crete context. Furthermore, assert the authors, such a
framework influences how individuals behave—e.g., an
argument is seen as an attempt to defeat another per-
son’s position; as such, one approaches an argument to
leave his or her opponent in a state of defeat. Thus, if an
alternative, non-quarrelsome metaphor was used to
characterize competitive exchanges, the nature of the in-
teractions would change, as agents behave in a manner
relative to the underlying framework. For example, con-
sider an argument in the framework of a cooperative
game—rather than striking a blow to an opponent’s argu-
ment, one might, instead, take a turn in order to ad-
vance toward a common goal. Similarly, Boroditsky
(2011) considers the notion of time within such a cultur-
ally derived framework, summarizing several experi-
ments that demonstrate how time is understood relative
to culturally and linguistically informed constraints. For
instance, time is often mapped onto spatial dimensions
which vary according to how a given language describes
temporal movement (e.g., time is up/down, forward/
backward) and how that language is written (horizon-
tally/vertically), providing an additional means to ground
abstract concepts. Native speakers of Mandarin Chinese,
for instance, regularly describe time as occurring verti-
cally; English speakers almost exclusively refer to time as
if it exists on a horizontal plane, advancing from left to
right (Boroditsky & Gaby, 2010). Speakers of both
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way that agrees with how their language is written. Thus,
the culturally derived metaphors ubiquitous in natural
languages may influence how individuals think about
their worlds as they map specific concepts onto
broader notions grounded in concrete ideas, such as
spatial dimensions.
In addition to Lakoff and Johnson’s assertion that a
metaphorical framework influences how concepts are
understood, a related though contentious literature
argues that physical states directly influence how ab-
stract metaphors are understood. Consistent with the
Western notion of the trajectory of time, one study
found that individuals tended to lean forward when
thinking about the future and backward when consider-
ing the past (Miles, Nind, & Macrae, 2010). Another
study found that individuals who had recently recalled a
situation where they were socially excluded guessed that
the room they were in was colder than did individuals
who had recalled a socially inclusive experience, suggest-
ing that being ostracized (i.e., “treated coldly”) literally
evokes a cold sensation (Zhong & Leonardelli, 2008).
These outcomes suggest that human beings may under-
stand abstract concepts by mapping them onto concrete
objects or physical sensations with which they are able
to directly perceive or experience. Barsalou and
Weimer-Hastings (2005) suggest that abstract represen-
tations rely on internal states to derive meaning across
situations—e.g., when seeing or hearing the word justice
a feeling of strength and relief is experienced in the
body. This suggests that abstract verbs are associated
with actions and feelings, involving an exchange between
one or more agents, and informed by the context—inter-
action of mental, physical, and environmental cues—in
which they occur.
Due to the evidence considered thus far, we would
predict that, at the systems level, abstract concepts are
associated with distributed neural representations
grounded in contextual—social, linguistic, affective,
spatial, and sensorimotor—regions of cortex, at least in
terms of processing the semantic meaning of the associ-
ated terms. Additionally, evidence suggests that the left
frontal polar region is a key structure for integrating the
structural properties between disparate analogous rela-
tionships—i.e., abstract concepts (Bunge, Wendelken,
Badre, & Wagner, 2005; Green, Fugelsang, Kraemer, Sha-
mosh, & Dunbar, 2006; Green, Kraemer, Fugelsang,
Gray, & Dunbar, 2010). Therefore, we would expect this
region to be active when one assesses a given scenario to
determine whether or not it fits the criteria of an
abstract concept—e.g., is the Boston Tea Party in fact an
example of justice? Consistent with these ideas, after
controlling for resting state and linguistic activity,
Wilson-Mendenhall, Simmons, Martin, and Barsalou(2013) found increased activation in neural regions asso-
ciated with social cognition and mentalizing (medial pre-
frontal cortex, posterior cingulate, orbital frontal cortex,
and superior temporal sulcus) while participants com-
puted the meaning of convince, and increased activation
in regions associated with mathematical processing
(intraparietal sulcus, superior parietal cortex) while
participants computed the meaning of arithmetic.
Importantly, after averaging the brain activity for the
two concrete and abstract concepts, these context-
specific distributed representations vanished, suggesting
that averaging across concepts may misconstrue activa-
tion patterns unique to the concepts they represent.
These data imply a great deal of variance in the neural
foundations of abstract concepts—consistent with the
idea that the conceptual representations that form the
neural basis of relational abstract ideas are context
dependent and supported by dynamic patterns of activity
over distributed networks.
Predictive coding and Hebbian learning
Evidence conferring a computational advantage for con-
textually rich concrete concepts (Xiao et al., 2012)
adheres to the predictive coding (PC; e.g., Barsalou,
2013; Friston, 2005; Summerfield et al., 2006) account of
conceptual retrieval. In essence, predictive coding
describes a hierarchical process by which sensory signals
sent from bottom-up perceptual systems in the brain
converge with top-down signals, or models. Such models
are derived from data collected over repeated exposure
to a given concept or situation—insofar as models are
unable to account for all situational variance, error sig-
nals are necessary for updating inaccurate predictions at
each stage in the hierarchy. Thus, predictive coding is
predicated on the notion that cortico-cortical circuits: 1)
are arranged hierarchically and 2) are comprised of feed-
forward (ascending) and feedback (descending) connec-
tions between subcortical structures and cortex, 3)
include both driving and modulatory connections, and
4) interact such that cortical neurons are able to model
corporeal states and subsequently modulate sensori-
motor neurons based on feedback loops producing error
at each level in the hierarchy (Friston, 2003). Thus, cor-
relating with incoming sensory data, cortical regions
predict external conditions based on models derived
from prior experience; this top-down model is compared
with perceptual input and updated via modulatory inter-
neurons at each layer in the hierarchy until the model
closely matches the sensory data, thereby reducing error
in the signal (Friston, 2012).
According to Friston, the predictive coding paradigm
aims to minimize entropy (e.g., uncertainty) in the sys-
tem via statistically aggregated, Bayesian inference
models. It is no surprise, then, that concrete knowledge
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ledge given its relative stability across contexts. In other
words, although concrete object concepts such as door
can take on many forms, the functionality and central
features of a door (e.g., opens and closes, serves to divide
two adjacent areas when closed and connect them when
open) are consistent. On the other hand, abstract con-
cepts such as justice are both context dependent (e.g.,
one may be considered just or unjust when stealing, de-
pending on the circumstances) and relational (multiple
agents are required for an act of justice to take place).
Thus, the features correlated with a circumstance in
which one might encounter an example of justice are
not as stable across contexts as those correlated with
door—I know that when I walk into a new building that
I am extremely likely to find a door and I will certainly
know how to use it, but whether or not I experience
justice and how the concept will play out in a given
context is radically different from one situation to the
next, depending on both subjective judgment (e.g., how
unjust is it for a sick individual to avoid paying a medical
bill she cannot afford to pay?) and cultural norms (see
Borghi & Cimatti, 2009, Boroditsky, 2011). Thus, ab-
stract concepts, compared to concrete-object concepts,
cannot be easily captured by a predictive model due to
the amount of error inherent in such a model. As a re-
sult, a larger computational burden is likely placed on
hierarchical cortico-cortical networks while processing
abstract concepts, as top-down and bottom-up circuits
work to interpret contextual variability.
Abstract concepts rely on data spanning a number of
unique circumstances. The word compassion, for
instance, is not directly correlated with a movement or
sensory representation. Nonetheless, the PC model is
applicable to this and other concepts, and several theories
(e.g., Barsalou & Weimer-Hastings, 2005; Martin, 2016)
address this discrepancy. Barsalou and Weimer-Hastings,
for instance, contend that abstract concepts are evoked in
the presence of an applicable situation; thus, when an in-
dividual witnesses a college student helping an elderly
man with his groceries, she assigns the label compassion
to the relationship between agents in a situational context.
According to the PC model, a high-level representation of
an abstract idea is generated when witnessing an applic-
able example—an episodic event comprised of social and
contextual features which may be referenced when en-
countering future instantiations of the concept. As incom-
ing sensory data conflict with the model’s expected
outcome, the model is updated to accommodate new
information. For example, if after helping the elderly man
one sees the college student being paid for his assistance,
the current model must be updated, as compassion does
not include selfish motives. Hence, we expect to see an
alteration in the neural representation of the conceptfollowing this update, as the model is revised. Therefore,
while abstract concepts are capable of being modeled
within a predictive coding hierarchy, we propose that such
models are highly volatile and are thus inconsistent pre-
dictors of the semantic features of a given concept.
Similar accounts pervade the literature. For example,
theories attributing conceptual knowledge to distributed
cell assemblies (e.g., Martin, 2016; Pulvermüller, 2013)
propose that disparate sets of neurons representing
distinct modality-specific properties (color, form, sound,
texture, etc.) aggregate in convergence zones (Damasio,
1989) located near the center, or hub, of neural circuits
where divergent regions converge to bind the features of
a given conceptual representation. Convergence zones
are likely candidates for the high-level conceptual
models within the PC framework—low-level feature cir-
cuits intersect in CZs where they inform and/or update
the current representation based on error signals. Im-
portantly, several studies (e.g., Hsu et al., 2012; Simmons
et al., 2007) report real-time feedback between low-level
perceptual areas in occipital cortex and higher-level con-
ceptual areas in fusiform gyrus for color perception, pro-
viding direct evidence of PC mechanisms.
While PC provides a plausible mechanism for model-
ing concepts both online and offline, it is also necessary
to discuss how divergent streams of information come
to be assembled within CZs, producing Bayesian hier-
archical models. Hebbian learning (e.g., long-term
potentiation; LTP) offers a proven and parsimonious ex-
planation of this phenomenon. According to LTP, when
two or more seemingly distinct events occur simultan-
eously across a number of episodes, the synaptic connec-
tions encoding the representation of each event are
strengthened to the degree that the neural firing associ-
ated with event A is enough to cause firing across the
synapse associated with event B and vice versa (Hebb,
1949). Hebbian associations, therefore, are the building
blocks of predictive models, as the features of events
which typically co-occur are hardwired together across
neural circuits. For instance, several papers (Glenberg &
Gallese, 2012; Lee, Turkeltaub, Granger, & Rizada, 2012)
hypothesize that language production shares a Hebbian
association with language comprehension. This relation-
ship may in fact account for language development—as
the babbling infant learns to associate specific mouth
movements with their correlated sounds, neurons in
Broca’s Area form an association with those in auditory
cortex. Thus, concurring with Lee and colleagues, novel
mouth movements are associated with distinctive speech
sounds and, therefore, hearing a word may activate
motor areas recruited when speaking the word, leading
to an understanding of the word via subsequent activa-
tion of associated modality-specific semantic networks.
Ibáñez et al. (2013) provide direct evidence for this
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fect (ACE; see Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002) in epilepsy
patients. The ACE task requires patients to respond to a cue
by moving in a direction either compatible or incompatible
with directional information implied in a sentence (e.g.,
“John was moving on after the breakup” = forward move-
ment). Previous studies have demonstrated robust interfer-
ence, as evidenced by slower RTs, when the motion used to
respond mismatches that implied in a sentence. Ibáñez et al.
(2013) measured the ACE using electro-corticography in
two epilepsy patients awaiting surgery by placing subdural
electrodes on the surface of the left fronto-temporal and
frontal cortex. When measuring both language and motor
responses while the patients processed the final verb in a
given sentence, a bi-directional effect was observed, evi-
denced by a negative evoked potential at 400 ms—a correl-
ate of semantic processing—in premotor, motor, and
language areas during incompatible trials. Presumably, the
increased N400 response, typically associated with an unex-
pected stimulus (e.g., Fabbri-Destro et al., 2015), indicates
incompatibility between the meaning derived from a sen-
tence and the direction of the required response. This out-
come suggests that both linguistic and motor content
provides meaningful information to readers, as the motor
system enhances language understanding while language
understanding modulates the motor system.
Consistent with these principles, Barsalou’s (2013)
Pattern Completion Inferences within Situated Concep-
tualizations (PCIwSC) theory suggests that associational
learning mechanisms may augment or even replace ex-
tant theories of conceptual modeling. PCIwSC proposes
that multiple neural networks representing disparate fea-
tures are integrated to capture the totality of a concept
by processing parallel streams of contextual, self-
referential, social, and sensorimotor data simultaneously.
For instance, according to this model, if I find myself in
a restaurant where I am meeting a coworker typically
dressed in a suit and he arrives in jogging pants and a
t-shirt, it may take me a few extra seconds to recognize
him. This delay may be due to the necessity of integrat-
ing novel input into and subsequently updating an erro-
neous model, given the fact that I have come to
associate a set of visual features (how my coworker is
dressed) with that person. Within my predictive model,
for example, the features of the face match my predic-
tion; however, because I am viewing my coworker from
across the room, the face prediction is not entirely
accurate and his clothing provides a mismatch with my
current predictive model.
Thus, Hebbian learning connects the sensory, motor,
and affective information constitutive of high-level
models. Further, the PC theory provides a parsimonious
explanation for concept formation, one which eschews
the need for a modality-independent semantic system—a controversial idea that opposes what we know about
the timescale for evolutionary development (for more on
this, see Barsalou, 2008; Dehaene & Cohen, 2007). It is,
therefore, not surprising that familiar objects, locations,
and smells are able to evoke elaborate conceptual repre-
sentations (the carnival or grandma’s house, for
instance), given that a single feature is capable of evok-
ing additional features constitutive of the entirety of the
concept. Consistent with this notion, widespread bilat-
eral neural activation patterns for both abstract and
concrete concepts are associated with faster RTs in a
word/non-word task, suggesting that highly distributed
representations confer a retrieval advantage (Binder
et al., 2005). With this advantage in mind, we propose a
grounded theory of STEM learning based on predictive
coding and Hebbian learning paradigms.
Neural representations of STEM concepts
Given the relatively short history of human scientific
inquiry, beginning with astronomy less than 10,000 years
ago (Ruggles, 1999), and because we know that it takes
hundreds of thousands of years for distinct neural sys-
tems to develop (Dehaene & Cohen, 2007), it is highly
unlikely that the human brain developed a distinct
neural system dedicated to processing the type of infor-
mation central to scientific conceptual understanding.
Instead, it is likely that older neural systems have accom-
modated and influenced the trajectory of scientific think-
ing. For instance, Dehaene and Cohen (2007) point out
the architectonic similarity between left hemispheric
regions associated with perceiving natural objects, the
fusiform face area (FFA) for example, and the visual
word form area (VWFA; thought to specialize in the rec-
ognition of written language patterns)—another recently
developed, culturally derived skill. These regions neigh-
bor one another and follow a distinctive hierarchical tra-
jectory, starting with cells specializing in perceiving
primitive shapes in the occipital cortex, and ending in
more anterior regions specialized for perceiving complex
forms (e.g., words or faces). Thus, Dehaene and Cohen
hypothesize that the human brain has co-opted the
existing function of regions that evolved to perform
tasks associated with our evolutionary lineage—e.g., rec-
ognizing natural objects in the environment. Accord-
ingly, culturally dependent functions, such as word
recognition and comprehension of symbolic number
magnitude, bootstrap the hardware necessary for more
primitive computations, such as object recognition and
estimation of physical magnitudes (e.g., size, distance,
quantity; but see Lyons, Ansari, & Beilock, 2015).
Supporting this assertion, Mason and Just (2016) used
fMRI to map the neural representation of physics con-
cepts in undergraduate and graduate students, and their
results were consistent with those of the neuronal
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addition to theories rooted in grounded cognition and
predictive coding. The authors divided physics concepts
into four discrete categorical factors—causal motion,
periodicity, algebraic equation representation, and
energy flow (also controlling for word length as a fifth
factor)—discovering that each factor was not only
discernable based on activation patterns, but also associ-
ated with activation in regions of the cortex underlying
primitive processes, such as spatial and sensorimotor
cognition. For instance, principles of causal motion (e.g.,
gravity and torque) relied upon the left IPS and left
MTG, regions associated with perceiving and visualizing
motion; when considering periodicity (e.g., wavelength
frequency) activation was seen in regions associated with
biorhythms (e.g., dancing, rhythm and meter in music,
etc.) and terrestrial cycles (e.g., tidal patterns), including
the dorsal PMC, bilateral parietal, and somatosensory
cortex. These data suggest that, concurring with theories
of grounded cognition, abstract scientific concepts are
comprehended based on embodied visuospatial repre-
sentations mapped onto corresponding cortical struc-
tures. Furthermore, these maps, grounded in
sensorimotor codes, are distributed and comprised of
features originating in disparate regions of the cortex,
which suggests that a higher order organizational sys-
tem is needed to assemble bottom-up features into a
coherent conceptual representation—in other words,
these data support the predictive coding theory of
cortical organization.
STEM learning interventions based in grounded cognition
Concepts in STEM learning range from those that can
be readily experienced—e.g., if I jump, gravity forces me
back to the ground—to ideas derived completely from
mathematical equations, such as the enigmatic force
known as dark matter. Given the accounts of abstract
knowledge representations described above, we predict
that concepts taught in STEM classrooms are better
understood when they are initially grounded in hands-
on learning activities. Given the nature of abstract con-
cepts—variability across contexts (Granito et al., 2015)
and the reliance on situational information (Barsalou &
Weimer-Hastings, 2005)—grounding scientific and
mathematical concepts in sensorimotor representations
provides students with a useful tool for placing abstrac-
tions in a readily accessible, concrete conceptual frame-
work. For instance, college students learning about
angular momentum, the physical force keeping moving
objects on a steady trajectory, can physically experience
the concept by manipulating an apparatus on which this
force was exerted (e.g., a bicycle wheel spinning on an
axle held by the student). In a study that examined the
advantages of using such a hands-on demonstration,students who actively engaged in the task demonstrated
a greater understanding of the concept relative to stu-
dents who had learned the same concept by merely
observing the demonstration (Kontra et al., 2015).
Additionally, fMRI data from the same participants dem-
onstrated robust activation differences between the
hands-on learning group and the observation group.
Regions in the premotor, motor, sensory, and parietal
cortex were more active when the active group answered
questions about angular momentum. Moreover, the au-
thors performed a mediation analysis to demonstrate
that the activation in the primary motor cortex
accounted for the between-group performance difference
on the test of concept understanding (Kontra et al., 2015).
According to embodied theories rooted in Hebbian learn-
ing and predictive coding, these results are a consequence
of multimodal (kinesthetic, visual, proprioceptive, affective,
etc.) associations integrated into a high-level conceptual
representation at the time of learning. In other words, the
students in the hands-on group are able to retrieve a rich,
sensorimotor representation, which in turn facilitates their
understanding of the abstract concept of angular momen-
tum, as evidenced by the neural and behavioral data.
A number of studies (e.g., Brooks, Ouh-Young, Battert,
& Kilpatrich, 1990; Han & Black, 2011) have observed
similar results. Han and Black used virtual learning envi-
ronments, enabling elementary students to develop vis-
ual, auditory, and haptic representations of mechanical
principles. The authors concluded that the addition of
the haptic dimension improved students’ performance.
While these data concur with the idea that contextual
features are absent in abstract representations, they sug-
gest an important role for the hands-on experience.
Perhaps, as proposed by radical embodied theories (e.g.,
Wilson & Golonka, 2013), motorically acting upon the
world confers knowledge otherwise unavailable. Another
plausible hypothesis is an extension of Dehaene and
Cohen’s (2007) theory of neuronal recycling. Processes
such as arithmetic and writing co-opt information pro-
cessing mechanisms in regions of the cortex evolutionar-
ily optimized for motor and spatial functions, such as
bilateral IPS and left OTC, taking advantage of abilities,
such as numerical quantity differentiation (e.g., three ba-
nanas is more than one banana) seen in monkeys, rats,
and other altricial species. Thus, the concept of numer-
ical magnitude is understood using the mechanisms of
the visual/haptic system that evolved to process magni-
tude in a physical sense (e.g., estimating distance to an
object one intends to grasp). In a similar vein, haptic
experiences may enable human beings to represent con-
cepts in motor cortex as described above.
In addition to hands-on activities, traditional learning
materials (e.g., schematic pictures and symbol represen-
tations) are effective insofar as they are easily
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curriculum (Fyfe, McNeil, Son, & Goldstone, 2014). A
curriculum which begins by teaching concepts via
hands-on, concrete activities before moving into more
abstract materials may be best suited to teach complex
scientific and mathematical information. Fyfe and col-
leagues propose a curriculum that orients students with
concepts by first using hands-on techniques and then
gradually moving to abstract materials traditionally asso-
ciated with mathematics and science—e.g., equations
and illustrative models. In other words, when initially
learning a concept, it is useful to constrain knowledge to
sensorimotor referents before placing it in a context di-
vorced from one’s first-hand experiences. In such a
learning framework, confusing abstract ideas are first
related to familiar, concrete objects, which aids in recall
when ambiguous abstract symbols are insufficient—e-
ventually, however, it is beneficial to strip such concepts
down to their fundamental core. However, as evidenced
by prior research (e.g., Barsalou & Weimer-Hastings,
2005; Binder et al., 2005), abstract concepts may eventu-
ally become left lateralized and generalizable, providing
students with a neural scaffolding and enabling conven-
tional teaching methods to be more easily understood. It
is therefore important that students learn to apply such
concepts independently of the context in which they
were initially learned, allowing them to easily generalize
across disciplines (e.g., geometry to physics). This sort of
scaffolding may attenuate the variability in the effective-
ness of laboratory-based activities, which can often be
attributed to confusing, overwhelming, or boring labora-
tory procedures which have vague or ambiguous connec-
tions to the concepts they are intended to convey
(Kirschner, Sweller, & Clark, 2006; Prince, 2004).
There have been conflicting reports concerning the
benefits of haptic experience on learning outcomes, as
some studies (e.g., Reiner, 1999) suggest that physical
sensation itself improves learning, while others (e.g.,
Klahr, Triona, & Williams, 2007; Triona & Klahr, 2003;
Olympiou & Zachariah, 2012) dispute this notion, dem-
onstrating that activities performed in virtual learning
environments result in similar benefits. In this vein,
Klahr and colleagues (Klahr et al., 2007; Triona & Klahr,
2003) and Olympiou & Zachariah (2012) argue that the
degree to which learners are actively engaged in the
learning process—rather than physical activity per
se—determines the outcome of learning. Accordingly,
virtual learning, they argue, can benefit students as
much as physical laboratory-based learning when it
comes to conceptual understanding. In other words,
virtual activities may improve students’ understanding of
conceptual knowledge as much as physical activities—in-
stead the relevant variable is whether the students can
actively manipulate the materials (virtual or physical) inthe process of learning. However, in these examples the
virtual laboratories use components that strongly resem-
ble familiar physical materials (e.g., glass beakers and
digital thermometers used to study changes in
temperature of various materials). In other words, these
virtual laboratories may already be somewhat grounded
in physical experience. It remains unknown, therefore,
to what degree the learning gains in the virtual task rely
on the neural representations of familiar physical repre-
sentations, which would not be observed for laboratories
that involve unfamiliar materials. Similarly, the targeted
concepts in these studies (e.g., heat transfer and the
mechanical properties of springs) did not specifically
produce phenomena that were surprising or counter-
intuitive. It remains unknown whether learning in such
situations would be facilitated or impeded by experiencing
only a virtual simulation versus a hands-on laboratory.
Suggestions for using neuroimaging to study STEM
learning
One potential way of understanding how the human
brain learns complex scientific concepts is to examine
learning outcomes based on neural markers (e.g., Cross
et al., 2009; Davachi, Maril & Wagner, 2001; Kontra
et al., 2015; Mason & Just, 2016) in addition to behav-
ioral measures. The studies described above that reveal
the neural basis of abstract concept representations in
physics (Kontra et al., 2015; Mason & Just, 2016) provide
neural markers for conceptual learning that can be used
in addition to more traditional paper-and-pencil tests of
learning. What remains to be seen is whether combining
the neural data with the traditional tests adds unique
explanatory power in predicting which students will re-
tain their conceptual understanding and be able to use it
appropriately at a later time, say 6 months or a year
later. For example, future studies can take an active
learning paradigm such as the one used by Kontra et al.
(2015) for teaching about the concept of angular
momentum and follow up with both a unit test from a
textbook, as well as a computerized task that taps con-
ceptual understanding while students undergo fMRI to
record brain activity. Then students can return to the
laboratory at some later time (e.g., after 6 months) for
another paper-and-pencil test on the same topic, or even
for a behavioral test of knowledge retention and transfer;
for example, a demonstration of conceptual knowledge
in which the student makes predictions about the out-
come of a laboratory experiment. The key question
would be whether performance on the follow-up test
would be best predicted by the original paper-and-pencil
test, or by the fMRI data, or by both combined. Such a
demonstration would not only confirm that we have suc-
cessfully identified sensitive neural markers of concep-
tual learning, it would also open the door for the use of
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ing the efficacy of a new instructional approach or
laboratory procedure.
Another challenge in teaching students to identify ab-
stract concepts from observable scientific data is that, by
definition, abstract concepts are not consistently associ-
ated with invariable observable physical features across
different contexts. Therefore, we must continue investi-
gating the influence of context on abstract conceptual
representation. One way of doing this is by directly com-
paring neural activity across ambiguous descriptions of
object concepts when different contexts are provided.
For instance, evoking a context by giving instructions to
point out objects fitting a given description—e.g., a func-
tional unit positioned at the end of a support arm—-
might result in similar neural patterns when identifying
functionally dissimilar objects—e.g., a hammer and a
street light. Such comparisons made across categories,
including functional, visual, and haptic similarity, could
inform the current debate between amodal and sensori-
motor theorists. Thus, if a hammer and a light pole are
represented similarly in the cortex while individuals
focus on the visual features of the objects, but differently
while they focus on functional characteristics, it would
be clear that contextual cues influence conceptual know-
ledge. Accordingly, we would expect to see distinct acti-
vation patterns when these principles are applied to
abstract versus concrete concepts (Borghi & Cimatti,
2009; Granito et al., 2015). Asking a participant to deter-
mine the likely air temperature, for instance, would lead
an observer to direct their gaze towards a scene as a
whole searching for key indicators, which could be mea-
sured via eye tracking; conversely, evaluating the struc-
tural integrity of an engineering apparatus (e.g., a truss)
might lead one to focus his or her gaze on specific fea-
tures within the object itself (e.g., joint fixtures). Further,
it is possible to infer which objects in a scene are im-
portant for understanding a given concept and at what
point attention is directed towards a given object or the
scene as a whole, for example, using multi-voxel pattern
analysis (MVPA), in addition to eye tracking and corre-
lated with measures of behavioral performance across
subjects. This type of analysis can also examine the po-
tential facilitating effect of top-down instructions (e.g.,
search cues) provided at various points in the instruction
process. Research on multimedia instruction has identi-
fied several best practices for reducing cognitive load as
well as pitfalls to avoid that lead to cognitive overload
(Mayer & Moreno, 2003). The addition of neural
markers of attention and of conceptual comprehension
will aid in further determining when a student is attend-
ing the appropriate details of the lesson. This informa-
tion can then be used to modify instruction accordingly,
adjusting factors such as when and how to introducenew facts and visual details in a multimedia lesson. In
this way, we will have an opportunity to design new
methods of teaching STEM concepts, taking advantage
of our understanding of the neural basis of conceptual
understanding.
Finally, future work should also aim to understand the
importance for conceptual learning of individual differ-
ences in specific cognitive abilities (e.g., verbal and visual
working memory; spatial visualization ability), prior
knowledge (e.g., earlier classes in the same content do-
main), and habits of thought (e.g., visual versus verbal
cognitive style). Each of these factors may play an im-
portant role in determining which students are likely to
adopt an effective learning approach in the context of a
specific lesson, or who may need additional support to
fully comprehend the new material. As noted above,
cognitive overload is likely to occur when working mem-
ory capacity is surpassed in a given modality (Mayer &
Moreno, 2003), such as when text and pictures appear
onscreen simultaneously. One’s threshold for informa-
tion overload that impairs task performance is
dependent on the individual’s working memory capacity
(Unsworth & Engle, 2007), and this capacity is also
known to be somewhat separable across verbal versus
visuospatial domains (Shah & Miyake, 1996). Thus, this
type of cognitive ability difference can lead to variability
in which students will most effectively learn from a spe-
cific lesson. Moreover, neural indices of working mem-
ory demand (e.g., Barber, Caffo, Pekar, & Mostofsky,
2013) can further refine our ability to detect cognitive
overload as it is occurring during a specific task or
instructional lesson, allowing for a careful analysis of the
contribution of this individual difference factor to suc-
cessful learning.
Similarly, individual differences in domains of cogni-
tive ability are well established (Carroll & Maxwell,
1979; Cattell, 1963; Horn & Cattell, 1966) and correlate
with performance in academic domains (Deary, Strand,
Smith, & Fernandes, 2007; Shah & Miyake, 1996; Wai,
Lubinski, & Benbow, 2005, 2009). Of particular interest
to the current discussion, spatial abilities predict per-
formance in STEM domains (Wai et al., 2005, 2009).
Surprisingly, little research has investigated whether
there are benefits to differentiating performance or study
strategies based on measures of visual, verbal, and spatial
abilities, which is an intriguing area of focus for future
work. Instead of considering these domain-specific
cognitive abilities, much attention has been given to
ideas such as Gardner’s theory of Multiple Intelligences
(Gardner, 1993), and the related idea of visual and verbal
learning styles, in which self-described “visual learners”
would prefer to learn from pictures rather than words,
and “verbal learners” would prefer words over pictures.
However, to date, no evidence exists to support these
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outcomes based on individuating instruction in this way
(Pashler, McDaniel, Rohrer, & Bjork, 2008; Visser,
Ashton, & Vernon, 2006). On the other hand, there does
seem to be some support for self-report measures of
cognitive style—consistencies in how an individual pro-
cesses information across contexts (e.g., Kozhevnikov,
Hegarty, & Mayer, 2002; Messick, 1984)—which correl-
ate with verbal, spatial, and object (visual but
non-spatial) domains (for a review, see Kozhevnikov,
2007). These dimensions of cognitive style correlate with
some measures of ability (Blazhenkova & Kozhevnikov,
2009; Kozhevnikov, Kosslyn, & Shephard, 2005) as well
as choice of career; for example, engineering majors are
likely to rate more highly on the spatial visual style di-
mension, whereas artists are more likely to rate highly
on the object visual style dimension. However, it is
unclear to what degree cognitive styles overlap with cog-
nitive abilities or whether they represent consistent but
flexible task approaches or strategies that can affect task
performance, but are somewhat malleable or amenable
to changes in instructions.
In this vein, work in our laboratory has demonstrated
distinct neural signatures for habits of thought corre-
sponding to representing information in a verbal versus
a visual modality (Hsu, Kraemer, Oliver, Schlichting, &
Thompson-Schill, 2011; Kraemer, Hamilton, Messing,
DeSantis, & Thompson-Schill, 2014a, Kraemer, Rosen-
berg, & Thompson-Schill, 2009). These propensities for
task strategies (i.e., verbal and visual cognitive styles)
have been shown to correspond to which types of infor-
mation participants encode when only visual informa-
tion is presented during a task (Kraemer et al., 2016).
These individual differences in cognitive style have also
been shown to correlate with what type of information
is successfully encoded and recalled (Kraemer et al.,
2016), performance on a visual feature retrieval task
(Hsu et al., 2011), and decisions made by participants in
ambiguous situations (Amit & Greene, 2012). Import-
antly, two of these studies have revealed that these task
approaches are somewhat flexible given changes in task
instructions (Kraemer et al., 2016) and task context (Hsu
et al., 2011), indicating that these individual differences
represent malleable factors that can potentially be lever-
aged to improve cognitive processing in a given context.
At this point, more research is needed to determine
whether and how these differences impact STEM learn-
ing specifically.
Conclusions
Embodied theories of cognition have reshaped the land-
scape of cognitive science, providing a rich literature that
has not only changed the way we look at the human mind,
but also inspired innovative learning interventions. AsAmerican students continue to struggle in the STEM
fields, it is imperative that scientists search for novel ways
to improve the scientific pedagogy. Here, we propose that
embodied exercises improve STEM learning by situating
abstract concepts in a concrete context, thus correlating
intangible ideas with corporeal information. In doing so,
rich multimodal distributed neural representations are
forged, giving students a better chance at succeeding in
the sciences.
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